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I 
INTRODUCTION: THE LACK OF BANKRUPTCY PROTECTIONS FOR SOVEREIGNS 
The recent global financial crisis vividly displayed the legal protections 
available in nonsovereign insolvencies. To use a prominent example in the 
United States, the massive Chrysler Corporation—whose $49 billion in revenue 
in 2007 was greater than the GDP of more than half the world’s nations1—was 
able to leverage the threat of declaring bankruptcy to extract economic 
concessions from its commercial lenders, bondholders, employees, and other 
creditors (with significant financial and political support from the U.S. 
Administration).2 Once Chrysler negotiated the terms of a sale with the 
majority of its creditors, it entered bankruptcy with a prepackaged petition, 
and, shortly thereafter, a new Chrysler entity emerged from the process as a 
going concern, no longer burdened by billions of dollars of debt.3 Although a 
minority of creditors challenged the Chrysler sale as a draconian invalidation of 
their contract rights, those efforts failed under the debtor-friendly rules of 
Chapter 11.4 
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 1. The 35 Largest U.S. Private Companies, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/fortune/0805/ 
gallery.private_companies.fortune/4.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009); WORLD BANK, World 
Development Indicators database, Gross domestic product 2007 (revised Sept. 10, 2008). 
 2. See Bill Vlasic & David E. Sanger, Debtholders v. U.S. Over Chrysler Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
22, 2009, at B1; Bill Vlasic, Holdouts Jeopardize Plan for Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at B1. 
 3. Michael J. de la Merced & Micheline Maynard, Fiat Deal with Chrysler Seals Swift 42-Day 
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at B4. 
 4. See In re Chrysler, LLC, 576 F.3d at 108. 
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As the Chrysler case illustrates—as would other recent examples, such as 
GM, Nortel, and the like—the safe harbor of insolvency law is a potent tool for 
private debtors who cannot afford to pay their creditors. Even before formally 
declaring bankruptcy, sophisticated parties can exploit creditor fears of judicial 
contract reformation to obtain voluntary liability reduction. Once a private 
company or individual enters bankruptcy, debt service and litigation against the 
debtor is automatically stayed pending the completion of a mandatory 
restructuring plan.5 Bankruptcy rules also allow for a post-insolvency market for 
“superpriority” (debtor-in-possession) financing, which the debtor can access to 
jumpstart its reorganization. 
In contrast to distressed private debtors, it is axiomatic that there are no 
bankruptcy protections for financially impaired sovereign states, though such a 
system has been advocated for since at least the time of Adam Smith.6 When a 
state cannot pay its debts, its only recourse is to enter voluntary negotiations 
with its creditors, which today are a miscellany of private and public entities 
with disparate agendas.7 Unlike the bankruptcy process for private debtors, 
participation in a sovereign debt workout is optional, and creditors may choose 
to opt out by bringing lawsuits on the face value of defaulted debt in order to 
obtain judgments, and try to execute on them. 
Although distressed sovereign debtors cannot use the shield of bankruptcy 
law to prevent creditor litigation, rules concerning foreign sovereign immunity 
have emerged as a rough, sometimes inadequate, proxy for insolvency laws. 
There are two categories of sovereign-immunity protections for foreign states: 
(1) immunity from suit and (2) immunity from execution. Protections 
concerning immunity from suit derive from the international principle that a 
sovereign should not be made to suffer the indignity of being haled into court 
against its will.8 Immunity from execution provisions stem from long-standing 
concerns about the disruptions and political ramifications that can result from 
the seizure of a foreign state’s property.9 Under the modern, “restrictive” theory 
 
 5. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
 6. See Charles Seavey, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court, 244 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 499, 499 (2006) (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 468 (Edwin 
Cannan ed., Methuen and Co. 2000) (1776) (“When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself 
bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and 
avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both the least dishonourable to the debtor, and least 
hurtful to the creditor.”)). More recently, there have been sporadic movements to create a bankruptcy 
analogue for sovereigns under the auspices of an international organization such as the IMF. See, e.g., 
Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2002); International Monetary Fund, The Design of the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism—Further Considerations (Nov. 27, 2002). To date, none of these proposals 
has garnered significant momentum. 
 7. See Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The Reform of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process: 
Problems, Proposed Solutions and the Argentine Episode, 1 J. RESTRUCTURING FINANCE 173 (2004). 
 8. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 144 (1812). 
 9. Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 256 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
international community viewed execution against a foreign state’s property as a greater affront to its 
sovereignty than merely permitting jurisdiction over the merits of an action.”). 
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of sovereign immunity—codified in some jurisdictions by national laws, such as 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in the United States—a foreign 
state’s immunity is subject to various exceptions, the extent of which are often 
at the heart of sovereign-litigation disputes.10 In a manner somewhat analogous 
to the way bankruptcy law provides the backdrop to negotiations between an 
insolvent private debtor and its creditors, the case law that has developed 
interpreting the scope of foreign sovereign immunity provides the background 
set of rules that inform the parties to a sovereign debt restructuring. 
This article examines the progression of sovereign debt case law as 
displayed by the succession of litigation strategies employed by professional 
suers of defaulted sovereign states. These plaintiffs are often referred to as 
“vulture funds” because their strategy is to buy sovereign debt instruments 
when a country is most vulnerable, which enables the funds to purchase the 
debt at a deep discount from its face value and attempt to enforce the full 
claims. This business plan necessarily depends on the lack of bankruptcy 
protection for sovereigns, but it is constrained by the sovereign-immunity rules 
that national legislatures have enacted and national courts have elaborated to 
protect the vultures’ targets from some of their attacks. 
In section II of this article, we provide some historical context for the 
emergence of investors specializing in speculation in sovereign debt litigation. 
In section III, we examine the first phase of vulture-fund suits against foreign 
sovereigns, which was dominated by litigation over the champerty defense—an 
English common-law doctrine that precluded the purchase of debt with the 
intent and purpose to sue upon it. In section IV, we look at the post-champerty 
phase of sovereign debt litigation, when some plaintiffs advanced a novel theory 
of pari passu as a “nuclear device” in their efforts to enforce judgments against 
sovereigns. In section V, we come to the present phase, with an increased focus 
on litigation over the “commercial activity” exception to execution immunity. 
We end with some concluding thoughts on the state of sovereign debt litigation. 
II 
BACKGROUND OF MODERN SOVEREIGN DEBT LITIGATION: THE SECONDARY 
DEBT MARKET AND ECONOMIC CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE 
Modern sovereign debt litigation was born from the rise of the secondary 
debt market and the attendant opportunities for arbitrage, which, in turn, gave 
life to an industry of professional suers of foreign states.11 The business plan of 
these entities is to purchase sovereign debt on the secondary market when it is 
being traded at a discount from its face value—often significantly so—because a 
 
 10. Even under the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign state’s property was 
completely immune from execution. However, national laws have partially lifted this absolute 
immunity. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR 
CORPORATIONS (Transnational Publishers 2d ed. 2003). 
 11. See Alon Seveg, Investment: When Countries go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor 
Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25 (2003). 
BLACKMAN & MUKHI 1/16/2011  
50 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:47 
country is so financially distressed that its debt is near or in default. The vulture 
funds take advantage of the lack of bankruptcy protection for foreign states by 
suing the financially distressed state and urging courts to take an expansive view 
of the exceptions to sovereign immunity.12 In doing so, the vulture funds’ 
managers speculate that they will be able to reap profits either by obtaining 
judgments and executing against nonimmune property of the state or by 
extracting profitable settlements because their lawsuits may have a significant 
nuisance value for the sovereign defendant.13 This strategy is possible in the first 
place only because foreign states lack the bankruptcy protections available to 
private debtors—if foreign states had such protections, litigation would be 
automatically stayed and a tribunal would impose a mandatory “haircut” on the 
creditors’ claims. 
The historical event that provided the impetus for the first wave of lawsuits 
by professional suers of states was the Latin American debt crisis of the early 
1980s.14 Throughout the 1970s, international commercial banks were flooded 
with petro-dollars from the Middle East as a result of skyrocketing oil prices.15 
The banks used the influx of deposits to extend commercial loans to Latin 
American countries that were hungry for capital.16 A subsequent rise in interest 
rates and a global recession resulted in a string of defaults on these loans, 
starting with Mexico in 1982.17 Facilitated by the United States–led Brady Plan, 
distressed sovereign loans became available on the market.18 Until this event, 
private sovereign debt was held primarily by large institutions, whose economic 
and political interests were oriented towards achieving a voluntary workout 
with the nation-debtor.19 The same was not true of market speculators, who 
 
 12. As explained by Lee Buchheit, two features of conventional financing documents used in the 
United States have contributed to vulture creditor activity: (1) the conventional amendment clauses in 
U.S.-style bonds and syndicated loans traditionally did not permit amendments to the payment terms of 
those instruments without the consent of every holder, and (2) U.S.-style trust indentures explicitly 
reserve to each individual creditor the right to sue for its share of a missed payment. See Lee C. 
Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1331–32 
(2002); Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpinski, Grenada’s Innovations, 20 J. INT’L BANKING L. & 
REG. 227, 230 (2006). The development of collective-action clauses (CACs) in sovereign debt 
investments beginning in 2003 has helped put a damper on some of this activity, and will do so to a 
greater extent in the future, but it does not affect litigation under debt incurred at earlier periods 
before CACs came into play. 
 13. See Jonathan C. Lippert, Note, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May Force a 
Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1, 27 (2008). 
 14. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043 (2004). 
 15. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, 
POLICY, AND REGULATION (2004). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Under the Brady Plan, the U.S. government allowed commercial banks to swap loans to 
distressed sovereigns for Treasury-backed bonds, and the securitized sovereign debt was in turn offered 
to the public. See Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and its 
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2708 (1996). 
 19. See Samuel E. Goldman, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 159 (2000). 
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purchased the rights to the impaired debt at a discount, and then rejected the 
voluntary restructuring process negotiated between the Latin American 
governments and the vast majority of their creditors.20 These funds then brought 
suit against the states to enforce the face value of the claims, plus interest. 
Following the broad Latin American crisis of the 1980s, new opportunities 
for vulture-creditor activity arose from debt defaults by the war-torn 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo)21 and the economic collapse in 
Argentina in 2001.22 The DR Congo’s debt was primarily commercial loans 
similar to the defaulted Latin American debt from the 1980s, while Argentina 
had directly accessed the public markets through global bond issuances 
throughout the 1990s. As these countries approached and entered default, 
vulture funds once again purchased discounted claims on the secondary market 
and launched a new wave of aggressive litigation campaigns.23 
The market availability of their defaulted debt explains the recurring role of 
Latin American and African countries as defendants in modern sovereign debt 
litigation. Beginning in earnest in the mid-1990s, and actively continuing 
through the present, professional plaintiffs instituted suits against these foreign 
states in the United States and elsewhere. The progression of modern sovereign 
debt litigation is linked to the successes and failures of the legal strategies 
employed by these professional plaintiffs in obtaining judgments against the 
states and trying to collect on them. 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, weak oil prices and a growing public sector combined to drive 
up the DR Congo’s debt to unsustainable levels. ABDELRAHMI BESSAHA ET AL., REPUBLIC OF 
CONGO: SELECTED ISSUES 12 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 07/206, June 2007), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07206.pdf. The country’s ensuing civil war exacerbated 
the DR Congo’s debt burden. Id. at 14. 
 22. “The collapse of the Argentine economy . . . was one of the most spectacular in modern 
history.” Paul Blustein, And The Money Kept Rolling In (And Out): Wall Street, The IMF, and the 
Bankrupting of Argentina 1 (Public Affairs 2005). Beginning in 1998, the Argentine Republic 
experienced an economic recession—later depression—which reached its nadir at the end of 2001 and 
beginning of 2002. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ARGENTINA’S SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING, 
Pub. No. RL32637, at 1 (2004). Argentina was hit especially hard by a sudden halt to capital inflows 
after the East Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian default in August 1998. Guillermo A. Calvo & 
Ernesto Talvi, Sudden Stop, Financial Factors, and Economic Collapse in Latin America: Learning from 
Argentina and Chile, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 119, 134–48 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008). In addition, demand from its 
primary trading partner, Brazil, fell sharply after Brazil devalued its currency in 1999, and Argentina’s 
exports became relatively more expensive due to a steep drop in commodity prices. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Argentina, Short-Changed: Why the Nation that Followed the Rules Fell to Pieces, WASH. POST, May 12, 
2002, at B1. Interest rate increases by the U.S. Federal Reserve, designed to slow down the United 
States economy, also had a drastic impact on Argentina and its dollar-pegged currency at a time when 
Argentina’s economy was contracting. Mark Weisbrot & Dean Baker, What Happened to Argentina?, 
CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH (Jan. 31, 2002), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ 
argentina_2002_01_31.htm.  
 23. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last 
Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 192–93 (2005) (discussing creditor attempts to seize Argentina’s U.S.-
based assets, including military assets and payments to its embassy). 
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III 
EARLY YEARS: THE CHAMPERTY DEFENSE 
As sovereign debt litigation came to the fore in the United States following 
the Latin American crisis of the 1980s, the sovereign-immunity defense from 
suit was often unavailable to the sovereign defendants, either because the states 
had waived such immunity in the debt contract or due to the application of the 
“commercial activity” exception. Under the FSIA, waiver of immunity from suit 
can either be explicit—which it often is, under transnational sovereign debt 
instruments—or implicit.24 Under the statute’s “commercial activity” exception 
to suit, the sovereign state’s presumption of immunity can be overcome even in 
the absence of a waiver when 
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory 
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.25 
Arguably, any activity conducted by a sovereign state is noncommercial in 
some sense. But in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,26 the Supreme Court 
held that, when a foreign state issues “garden variety” public debt in the U.S. 
market, it is engaging in commercial activity here regardless of the activity’s 
purpose, and the state may thus be sued based upon that act.27 This decision 
essentially foreclosed the sovereign-immunity defense to suit for countries that 
had accessed the U.S. debt markets and had agreed to repayment in the United 
States.28 
Notwithstanding the foreign states’ lack of a sovereign-immunity defense to 
suit, early lawsuits brought by professional creditor-plaintiffs were frequently 
found to be both procedurally and substantively flawed, even without reference 
to sovereign-immunity principles. A suit brought against Panama by a precursor 
to Elliott Associates—which would become one of the most prolific litigants 
 
 24. “An express waiver under section 1605(a)(1) must give a clear, complete, unambiguous, and 
unmistakable manifestation of the sovereign’s intent to waive its immunity.” See Aquamar S.A. v. Del 
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “Courts 
have found implied waiver where a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading without raising the 
defense of sovereign immunity . . . [and] where the state has agreed to arbitrate or to adopt a particular 
choice of law.” World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). This exception to suit is broader than the FSIA’s commercial-
activity exception to execution, which applies in the stricter circumstances when property of the foreign 
state is in the United States and being “used for” a commercial activity in the United States. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610(a) (2006); see, e.g., Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 255 
(“Congress used the more specific phrase ‘used for a commercial activity’ in [Section 1610] rather than 
the less specific phrase ‘in connection with a commercial activity’ used in Section 1605.”). 
 26. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 27. Id. at 617. 
 28. In another significant early decision, the Second Circuit also rejected the common-law “act of 
state” defense to nonpayment of sovereign debt. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de 
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522–23 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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against foreign states—was dismissed based upon the fund’s failure to disclose 
its principal.29 Vulture funds tend to be secretive about their investors, which is 
not surprising, given the political distastefulness of seeking to reap profits at the 
expense of indebted, and typically very poor, countries and their citizenry.30 Yet 
knowing the identity of one’s litigation adversary is a matter of fundamental 
fairness and is invariably essential to defending against claims and establishing 
affirmative defenses. In Water Street, Judge Baer found the plaintiff’s steadfast 
refusal to disclose its ultimate human owners to be unacceptable, and he 
dismissed the case outright.31 
A suit based on nonperforming Brazilian debt brought by members of the 
Dart family—who would also come to figure prominently as professional 
plaintiffs in sovereign debt litigation—was also short-circuited notwithstanding 
the existence of U.S. jurisdiction.32 In the midst of the Latin American crisis of 
the 1980s, Brazil restructured its debt with its commercial lenders pursuant to a 
Multi-Year Deposit Facility Agreement (MYDFA). The Darts bought a 
significant amount of MYDFA debt at a deep discount on the secondary 
market—so much so that they became one of Brazil’s largest foreign creditors.33 
When Brazil later sought to restructure its MYDFA debt under the Brady Plan, 
the Darts held out and brought suit in the Southern District of New York. The 
district court held, however, that the plaintiffs could not accelerate principal 
under the MYDFA’s contractual terms, which required at least fifty percent of 
the creditors to vote for acceleration.34 
The most potent defense asserted by foreign states in these early cases was 
champerty. Had the courts broadly accepted this defense asserted by foreign 
 
 29. Water Street Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Republic of Panama, No. 94 Civ. 2609 (HB), 1995 WL 
51160 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1995). 
 30. See, e.g., Gordon Brown, The Chancellor of the Exchequer and IMF Governor for the U.K., 
Financing A World Fit For Children, Speech at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
on Children (May 10, 2002), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./newsroom_and_speeches/ 
press/2002/press_46_02.cfm (“We particularly condemn the perversity where Vulture Funds purchase 
debt at a reduced price and make a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the full amount 
owed—a morally outrageous outcome.”); John B. Taylor, Under Secretary Of Treasury For 
International Affairs, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the Conference 
on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes And Hazards? (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/ 
press/releases/po2056.htm. 
 31. Water Street Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Republic of Panama, 1995 WL 51160, at *1; See Elliott 
Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 961 F. Supp. 82, 86–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing discovery of the 
principals and management of plaintiff). 
 32. CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman), Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 33. See Agasha Mugasha, Solutions for Developing-Country External Debt: Insolvency or 
Forgiveness?, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 89 (2007). 
 34. The plaintiff had alleged that Brazilian officials had ordered Banco do Brasil, S.A., to hold an 
amount of MYDFA debt greater than the Darts’ share, specifically to prevent the family from 
accelerating the principal. Another nonjurisdictional issue raised in some of the earlier cases was the 
court’s discretion to stay suits against a financially distressed sovereign to permit consensual debt 
restructuring to take place. Such stays would not be permitted to last indefinitely, but courts would 
retain the ability to impose them for appropriate periods. Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular 
Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 855 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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state-defendants, it could effectively have ended the industry of speculating in 
sovereign debt litigation. Champerty, originated in English common law and 
later adopted by state legislatures, forbids as an abuse of process the purchase 
of debt with the intent, and for the purpose of, bringing a lawsuit.35 The defense 
had a natural application to the claims brought by vulture funds against foreign 
states since the funds’ strategy necessarily anticipated litigation following the 
purchase of nonperforming debt. 
In Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru,36 the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York held that champerty barred claims brought 
by Elliott Associates on nonperforming debt of the Republic of Peru.37 The 
district court allowed Peru to conduct discovery of Elliott in connection with its 
champerty defense, and the court’s opinion detailed the facts surrounding the 
formation of Elliott’s sovereign debt litigation strategy, which it found ran afoul 
of the champerty rule.38 But in a game-changing decision, the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court,39 holding that if the suer’s intent in purchasing the 
discounted debt was to be paid in full or otherwise to sue, such intent did not 
meet champerty’s intent requirement. The Court of Appeals found Elliott’s 
intent to sue on the debt was “contingent” even though “Elliott knew Peru 
would not, under the circumstances, pay in full.”40 The Second Circuit’s narrow 
reading of the champerty defense was accepted by other courts, as by the D.C. 
District Court in Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia,41 and saved the business of 
speculating in defaulted sovereign debt from what would otherwise have been a 
major setback. 
Despite the Second Circuit’s ruling in Elliott Associates, some residual 
uncertainty remained concerning the application of the champerty defense in 
New York state courts.42 Not willing to leave the fate of its business model to 
judicial chance, vulture funds apparently lobbied the New York state legislature 
to amend the law by statute.43 And on August 17, 2004, the New York state 
legislature amended N.Y. Judiciary Law 489 to effectively eliminate the defense 
of champerty as to any debt purchases or assignments having a value of more 
than $500,000. 
 
 35. See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business 
Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 486–89 (1992). 
 36. 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 37. Elliott had rejected Peru’s Brady exchange offer, which closed in March 1997, and was 
achieved based on Peru’s verbal promise not to provide any extra benefits to holdout creditors. Sönke 
Häseler, Individual Enforcement Rights in International Sovereign Bonds (German Working Papers in 
L. & Econ., Paper No. 17, 2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss1/art17.  
 38. 12 F. Supp. 2d at 333–35; but see Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 
332 (S.D.N.Y 1997); Banque de Gestion Privee-SIB v. Republica de Paraguay, 787 F. Supp. 53 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 39. 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 40. Id. at 379. 
 41. 193 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 42. See, e.g., Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 94 N.Y.S.2d 726, 736 (N.Y. 2000). 
 43. See Memorandum in Support, New York State Assembly, Bill Number: A7244C. 
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IV 
SECOND PHASE: PARI PASSU 
With the defeat of the champerty defense, the path was clear for litigants to 
purchase defaulted sovereign debt, to reject the sovereign’s voluntary 
restructuring process, and to obtain judgments at the obligation’s face value. 
The paper judgments were just that, however, and plaintiffs still faced a high 
hurdle in executing on foreign state property. The focus of sovereign debt 
litigation thus quickly turned to judgment enforcement against the debtor 
states. 
Judgment creditors apparently recognized from the outset that scanning the 
globe for nonimmune, executable property of a foreign state could prove to be 
an expensive and fruitless exercise. As an alternate to this pursuit, vulture funds 
invented what they believed could be a devastating enforcement device—an 
expansive application of the pari passu clause contained in many sovereign debt 
instruments.44 The pari passu provision is a standard clause in cross-border 
lending agreements that contains a borrower’s promise to ensure that the 
obligation will always rank equally in right of payment with all of the 
borrower’s other unsubordinated debts.45 The international financial markets 
long understood the clause to protect a lender against the risk of legal 
subordination in favor of another similarly situated creditor.46 
In 2000, Elliott sought to enforce its judgment against Peru—the same 
judgment that the Second Circuit had held was not precluded by champerty—
by advancing a novel interpretation of the pari passu clause. Elliott argued that 
not only was Peru barred from legally subordinating its loan debt under the 
agreement’s pari passu clause, but the same provision precluded Peru from 
paying other creditors (such as holders of restructured debt) without also 
paying it pro rata as a judgment creditor on the defaulted contract. Elliott 
succeeded ex parte on this argument in the Brussels Court of Appeals in 
Belgium and blocked a payment that Peru was to make to the holders of its 
 
 44. See generally Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2003). 
 45. “In a loan agreement, the pari passu clause is often drafted as follows: ‘The payment 
obligations of the borrower under this Agreement rank at least pari passu with all its other present and 
future unsecured obligations.’ In an international securities issue, the pari passu clause is usually found 
in the ‘status’ or ‘ranking’ condition and is often drafted as follows: ‘The bonds and the coupons are 
direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the issuer and rank and will rank at least pari passu, 
without any preference among themselves, with all other outstanding, unsecured and unsubordinated 
obligations of the issuer, present and future.’” Financial Markets Law Committee, Issue 79—Pari Passu 
Clauses (Mar. 2005). 
 46. Modern commercial bank loans and bonds for purely domestic lending to corporate borrowers 
do not usually contain any form of pari passu representation or covenant. See Buchheit & Pam, supra 
note 44. Presumably, this reflects the lenders’ confidence that U.S. law (1) does not permit an 
involuntary subordination of an existing creditor and (2) calls for a ratable payout in bankruptcy of all 
similarly-situated creditors within each class to the extent of available assets. Id. 
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restructured debt via Euroclear47 on the theory that it violated the pari passu 
provision in Peru’s defaulted debt.48 Peru quickly settled with Elliott, which 
realized a significant return on its original investment. 
Not surprisingly, Elliott and others were encouraged by the result against 
Peru in Belgium and brought other enforcement actions based on the same pari 
passu theory. In Red Mountain Finance v. Democratic Republic of Congo,49 a 
U.S. district court in California appeared to reject the pari passu theory as such, 
but, for unexplained reasons, nonetheless enjoined the DR Congo from making 
any payments on its “External Indebtedness” (as defined in the credit 
agreement) without making a proportionate payment to Red Mountain.50 Like 
Peru, the DR Congo ultimately settled the case. In LNC Investments v. 
Nicaragua,51 plaintiffs once again asserted this theory in Belgium and obtained 
an ex parte order blocking Nicaragua’s payment on certain bonds that were to 
be made by Euroclear. Unlike Peru and DR Congo, though, Nicaragua 
appealed. 
The tide began to turn against Elliott’s pari passu strategy in Kensington 
International Ltd. v. Republic of Congo.52 In Kensington, an affiliate controlled 
by Elliott sought the same result in London that Elliott had achieved in 
Belgium. But the English court denied Kensington’s attempt to restrain the 
Congo from paying its other creditors without paying it pro rata based on 
Elliott’s pari passu theory.53 The English trial judge recognized the claim as 
“novel” and “unprecedented,” although he ultimately denied—and the 
appellate court affirmed—the injunction attempt on equitable grounds, 
including the plaintiff’s failure to identify who it was or how much it had paid 
for its debt. 
Elliott’s pari passu strategy was dealt another severe blow when the Brussels 
Court of Appeals, this time with the benefit of an adversary presentation, 
reversed course in LNC Investments v. Nicaragua and held that, irrespective of 
the construction of the contractual pari passu clause, that clause could not be 
invoked against Euroclear (the settlement agent under Nicaragua’s indemnity 
bonds) since Euroclear was not a party to the contract under which the pari 
 
 47. Euroclear is a financial intermediary based in Brussels, which settles domestic and 
international securities transactions. See https://www.euroclear.com/site/public/EB. 
 48. See Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR192. 12 (Ct. App. of Brussels, 8th 
Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000) (“It also appears from the basic agreement that governs the repayment of the 
foreign debt of Peru that the various creditors benefit from a pari passu clause that in effect provides 
that the debt must be repaid pro rata among all creditors. This seems to lead to the conclusion that, 
upon an interest payment, no creditor can be deprived of its proportionate share.”). 
 49. Case No. CV 00-0164 R, 2000 WL 34479543 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2000). The case was heard by 
Judge Real, one of the most often reversed judges in the Ninth Circuit. See Carol J. Williams, Critics 
Want to Bench Judge Manuel L. Real, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009. 
 50. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 44, at 881. 
 51. Commercial Court of Brussels, Sept. 11, 2003. 
 52. [2003] EWHC (Comm) (Eng.). 
 53. See id. 
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passu clause arose.54 By this time, Belgian legislators had also taken notice that 
Elliott’s pari passu campaign, and the Belgian courts’ unpredictability on the 
issue, might undermine Belgium’s place in the world financial markets. The 
Belgian Parliament thus instituted a law shielding Euroclear from injunctions.55 
In the District Court for the Southern District of New York, Elliott and 
other creditors suggested that they might pursue the pari passu theory in their 
lawsuits against Argentina pending before that court. Both the United States 
government and the Clearing House Association of New York Banks filed 
amici statements opposing Elliott’s pari passu interpretation, but the New York 
federal court ultimately declined to address the issue, ruling that the case was 
not ripe for review.56 Perhaps in light of these statements, nothing further has 
been heard of the pari passu argument in more recent court proceedings.57 
For whatever reason, the Elliott pari passu strategy seems to have receded 
from the forefront of creditor enforcement strategies. Managers of vulture 
funds may have sensed that the political and legal climates were aligning 
towards a conclusive defeat of the theory. Without the ability to freeze the 
debtor–foreign state’s payments to other creditors via pari passu, plaintiffs were 
forced to concentrate on trying to directly execute against foreign state 
property, which has animated the current phase of sovereign debt litigation. 
V 
CURRENT PHASE: EXECUTION LITIGATION 
Limits on execution against a foreign state’s property, however, present a 
significant obstacle for litigants that hold judgments against foreign states. The 
exception to execution immunity that professional litigants against foreign 
states have most frequently raised is the “commercial activity” exception. 
Under the FSIA, this exception provides that a creditor may execute against a 
foreign state’s property to the extent that the property is in the United States 
and “used for” a commercial activity in the United States.58 
Early cases interpreting the commercial-activity exception to execution 
immunity focused on whether the nature of property was such as inherently to 
make its use the support and maintenance of governmental functions of the 
sovereign. To the extent that a foreign state’s property was for the benefit of the 
government’s sovereign activities, courts found the commercial-activity 
 
 54. Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Invs. & Euroclear Bank, S.A., No. 2003/KR/334 (Court of 
Appeals of Brussels, 9th Chamber, Mar. 19, 2004). 
 55. See Belgian Law 1119201, art. 15. 
 56. Transcript of Conference Before Judge Thomas P. Griesa, at 9, Applestein v. Republic of 
Argentina and Province of Buenos Aires, No. 02 CV-1773 (TPG), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14083 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2004). 
57.  Very recently, for the first time since 2004, pari passu has reared its head again in a new 
attempt by Elliott to argue that an Argentine law enacted in 2005 to regulate exchange offers for 
defaulted debt violated the pari passu clause. How this effort will fare remains to be seen. 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2006). 
BLACKMAN & MUKHI 1/16/2011  
58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:47 
exception inapplicable. In LNC Investments, Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua,59 a 
vulture creditor sought an attachment in New York of taxes collected and paid 
by American and Continental Airlines to Nicaragua. The court held that 
because taxation is a uniquely governmental activity in which private persons 
cannot and do not engage, the tax obligations were noncommercial property 
and thus immune under Section 1610(a).60 
A milestone in execution litigation against sovereigns that refined the 
approach to the commercial-activity exception to execution immunity was the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of 
Congo.61 The Fifth Circuit placed particular emphasis on the statutory phrase 
“used for” under Section 1610(a) of the FSIA, which provides that a foreign 
state’s property must be “used for” a commercial activity in the United States in 
order to be subject to execution. By inserting the phrase “used for,” the Fifth 
Circuit said Congress had made clear its intent that “[w]hat matters under the 
statute is not how [the foreign state] made its money, but how it spends it.”62 
The Fifth Circuit thus held that the relevant inquiry concerning the tax and 
royalty obligations at issue was not only the property’s nature, but also whether 
and how the assets had been “used” by the state.63 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
centrality of the “use” analysis in Walker International Holdings Ltd. v. 
Republic of Congo, when it held that purported property of the Congo could 
not be attached when there was no evidence of how the property had been 
“used,” let alone any evidence that it had been used for a commercial activity in 
the United States.64 The Second and Ninth Circuits followed the Fifth Circuit’s 
lead, which confirmed that the “used for” commercial-activity exception was a 
narrow one.65 
 
 59. No. 96 Civ. 6360 (JFK), 2000 WL 745550 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000). 
 60. See Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 77–78 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (denying attachment of tax obligations because “[t]he levy and collection of taxes intended to 
serve as revenues for the support and maintenance of governmental functions are an exercise of powers 
particular to a sovereign”). 
 61. 309 F.3d 240. 
 62. Id. at 253. 
 63. Id. at 256–58. 
 64. 395 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2004) (“While these funds could indeed be used for other 
commercial purposes, such as debt service, Walker does not make this assertion.”) (citation omitted). 
 65. See EM, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 481 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 
S. Ct. 109 (2007); Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo), Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“[P]roperty is ‘used for a commercial activity in the United States’ when the property in question is put 
into action, put into service, availed or employed for a commercial activity, not in connection with a 
commercial activity or in relation to a commercial activity.”) (emphasis in original); Ministry of Def. & 
Support for the Armed Servs. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 495 F.3d 1024, 
1037 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because repatriation into a ministry’s budget does not constitute commercial 
activity, we hold that the . . . [property] is not subject to attachment under § 1610(a).”); Colella v. 
Republic of Argentina, No. C 07-80084 (WHA), 2007 WL 1545204, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) 
(noting that the Argentine equivalent of Air Force One was only “used for” transporting the President 
of Argentina, and that “[s]ervice and maintenance do not convert the airplane into an implement used 
in commerce any more than filling its tanks with jet fuel would be considered a commercial use”). 
Other litigation under §1610 has focused on the requirement that the foreign state’s property be used 
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Not only are judgment creditors faced with a narrow exception to immunity 
for the foreign state’s property under these decisions, but also, in any event, 
insolvent sovereign debtors rarely have even arguably attachable assets in 
jurisdictions where execution is possible. Judgment creditors have thus, more 
recently, turned their sights to property of agencies or instrumentalities of the 
state—which may be more likely than the state itself to maintain assets outside 
of their home jurisdiction—and have argued that the property of those entities 
should be available to satisfy judgments of the state. Plaintiffs must nonetheless 
grapple with the Supreme Court’s decision in First National City Bank v. Banco 
Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec), which held that agencies or 
instrumentalities of a state are entitled to a presumption of legal status 
independent from that of the state itself.66 To overcome that presumption, 
plaintiffs must sue the entity, serve it, obtain jurisdiction over it under the 
FSIA, and meet the exacting standards of Bancec and its progeny for 
disregarding its separate status. And when attempting to reach property held by 
a foreign state’s central bank, creditors face an even higher bar because central 
banks are afforded heightened protections under the FSIA.67 
Some judgment creditors have made creative arguments in attempting to 
evade Bancec’s application—for instance, by arguing that the foreign state had a 
direct ownership interest in the property held by the agency or instrumentality. 
But such efforts have mostly failed. In EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,68 
entities controlled by Elliott and the Dart family sought to block a payment by 
Argentina’s central bank to the IMF and attach reserves held by the bank at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The funds argued that because Argentina 
had authorized its central bank to pay back the IMF on its behalf, Argentina 
acquired a property interest in the central bank’s reserves. The Second Circuit 
disagreed and held that it saw 
no reason why the presumption of separateness required by Bancec . . . should not 
apply here to shield the [reserves] from attachment. . . . We reject plaintiffs’ effort to 
circumvent Bancec . . . by characterizing [Argentina’s] ability and willingness to 
control BCRA as a transfer of property rights sufficient to give the Republic an 
attachable interest in [the central bank’s reserves.]69 
The court further recognized that funds used to repay the IMF were not 
“used for a commercial activity” since only sovereigns can borrow from the IMF 
and pay it back, and the targeted funds at issue had not in any event been used 
 
“in the United States.” See Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2004) (a foreign 
state’s interest was located in the United States because the garnishee was located here), but see FG 
Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. République du Congo, 455 F.3d 575, 589–90 (5th Cir. 2006) (the interest at 
issue in Af-Cap was not in the United States when the garnishee was no longer located here). 
 66. 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983). 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006); LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, 115 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362–63 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., LNC Invs., Inc. v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 228 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 68. 473 F.3d 463. 
 69. Id. at 479. 
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for Argentina’s repayment.70 And, although it did not need to reach the issue, 
the Second Circuit also noted the heightened protections given to central-bank 
funds under the FSIA.71 
Most recently, various vultures—led by Aurelius Capital Partners, LP 
(Aurelius), a recent fund created by former Elliott portfolio managers—sought 
to execute on social security funds of Argentine citizens that had been invested 
in New York by private pension fund managers.72 In December 2008, the 
Argentine Congress enacted legislation to restructure the hybrid public–private 
Argentine national social-security system by returning it to a single, unified 
system under the management of Argentina’s public social-security 
administration. The district court granted motions for execution on the social-
security funds managed by the private managers in New York based on the 
plaintiffs’ premise that the new Argentine legislation made these funds 
attachable property of the state because the Argentine law transferred 
responsibility for administering them to Argentina’s public social security 
agency. The Second Circuit reversed and vacated the orders because the funds 
had not been used by the state for a commercial activity in the United States.73 In 
this context, the Court of Appeals concluded, 
As we read ‘used for a commercial activity,’ we hold that a sovereign’s mere transfer 
to a governmental entity of legal control over an asset does not qualify the property as 
being ‘used for a commercial activity.’ A contrary conclusion would essentially nullify 
the Act’s commercial activity requirement in cases involving attachment and 
execution of a foreign state’s property.74 
On the heels of the Second Circuit’s rejection of its attempt to execute 
against Argentine social security funds in the United States, Aurelius then tried 
to execute against Argentine social security funds maintained in custodial 
accounts in Argentina.75 The district court rejected this second execution 
attempt under the FSIA because the purported foreign state property was 
neither “in the United States” nor “used for a commercial activity in the United 
 
 70. See id. at 481–85. 
 71. Id. at 485–86 (citing LNC Invs., 115 F. Supp. 2d 358). In EM, supra note 68, the Second Circuit 
noted that plaintiffs had purposely declined to argue that the central bank was the alter ego of the state 
proper under the standards set forth by Bancec. Id. at 480–81. Nevertheless, while the appeal was 
pending, the same plaintiffs filed a new alter ego action against Argentina and its central bank and 
simultaneously sought to attach the same funds at issue in EM based upon the alter ego theory. The 
district court recently granted plaintiffs’ alter ego application, and the appeal of that decision is now 
pending. EM, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 Civ. 2507 (TPG), 2010 WL 1404119 (S.D.N.Y. 
April 7, 2010), appeal docketed, 10-1487 (CON) (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2010). 
 72. Aurelius Capital Partners, L.P. v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2009), cert 
denied 130 S. Ct. 1691 (2010). 
 73. Id. at 131 (“[B]efore the retirement and pension funds at issue could be subject to attachment, 
the funds in the hands of the Republic must have been ‘used for a commercial activity.’”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 74. Id. Based on this finding under Section 1610(a), the Second Circuit concluded that it need not 
address whether the funds were also immune from attachment because they were to be managed under 
the new law by a presumptively separate agency or instrumentality of Argentina. 
 75. See Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, No. 07 Civ. 2715 (TPG), 2010 WL 
768874 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010). 
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States.”76 In vacating the district court’s stay pending appeal, the Second Circuit 
also held that plaintiffs were unlikely to “succeed on the merits of a claim that 
the custodial accounts at issue are being used for a commercial activity in the 




The case law interpreting the scope of sovereign immunity has often 
developed in response to the various litigation paths that professional plaintiffs 
have undertaken. In effect, sovereign debt litigation has begun to resemble a 
chess match: a move by a vulture is blocked or countered, and a new move or 
theory comes into vogue as another avenue to try to increase the chances of 
recovery. Unfortunately, for the state defendant, this is not a game; the 
vulture’s portfolio may be diversified, and it may believe that it only needs an 
occasional big win to recoup its costs of carry-and-litigation expense. For the 
state however, what is at issue is not a litigation gamble, but the economic and 
social welfare of its citizens. Eventually, something other than litigation may be 
the answer to sovereign debt defaults. But until that day comes, if it ever does, 
judicial decisions of the kind described in this article will provide the framework 
for how states and their creditors attempt to deal with these problems. 
 
 
 76. Id. at *4. 
 77. Motion Order, Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 10-837-cv (CON) (2d 
Cir. Mar. 24, 2010), appeal withdrawn, Apr. 9, 2010. 
